Universities, revered as hubs of knowledge and innovation, play a pivotal role in facilitating groundbreaking innovation across diverse disciplines. However, behind the tranquil facade of academia lies a clandestine domain of secrecy. Presently, Western universities grapple with an escalating challenge— academic espionage. These esteemed institutions have become alluring targets for foreign actors seeking to engage in illicit activities, with students unwittingly categorised as “magnetic targets” in this web of intrigue.
The reputation of Western universities rests on their distinguished culture of openness and collaboration, but it also entails a significant trade-off. On the one hand, this culture of collaboration plays a pivotal role in driving forward the frontiers of knowledge. However, on the other hand, the very same environment that fosters progress becomes an alluring opportunity for foreign actors to exert influence and garner technological advances at a fraction of the time and cost.
Amid the challenges clandestine agencies face when operating within the knowledge clusters in the private sector, academic espionage has traction as an attractive alternative. The Chinese Thousand Talents Program represents a hallmark of this growing phenomenon. Talent recruitment endeavours are strategically directed at procuring external knowledge and innovation from foreign nations to fortify national, military, and economic aspirations. The extraction of knowledge from universities, particularly in technologically advanced fields, presents adversaries with considerable competitive edges. However, this focus is not limited solely to technical domains. The social sciences and humanities also come under scrutiny, with concerted efforts to propagate a pro-Chinese narrative beyond national borders. This multifaceted approach underscores the growing significance of academic espionage in the pursuit of global influence.
The U.S. has been particularly affected by this phenomenon. In 2020, Harvard’s Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department was just one of the many targets and publicised cases. Chair of the department and two Chinese nationals, posing as students, were charged in connection with aiding the PRC. The Chair, Dr Leiber, engaged in a strategic partnership with Wuhan’s University of Technology to establish a research lab, whilst the two Chinese nationals helped smuggle valuable biological research, which was later published under their names. Notably, one of the Chinese nationals, Yanqing Ye, was found to have accessed U.S. military websites and conducted research on U.S. military projects. Additionally, information was compiled for the PLA on two U.S. scientists with expertise in robotics and computer science.
In the United States, protecting the integrity of academic environments has become a priority. In 2017, discussions on restricting visas for foreign STEM applicants began as a national security measure to prevent intellectual property transfers. Legislative attention has grown with the “Protect Our Universities Act,” monitoring foreign student involvement in sensitive research, and the Senate’s approval of the Confucius Act to oversee Confucius Institutes on campuses. These efforts aim to fortify national security while preserving academic freedom.
Efforts extend beyond legislation, with a strong emphasis on raising awareness through readily available training. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center provides valuable resources to heighten threat awareness for industry and academia. Simultaneously, the FBI equips universities with vital information on academic espionage threats, offering effective countermeasures to protect academic information.
Universities in Europe are not impervious to this threat, but their current efforts and awareness appear to be trailing those of the U.S. As far back as 2005, the European Centre for Strategic and Security Studies sounded the alarm about Chinese spies infiltrating Belgian universities under the guise of students. Similarly, in Germany, A Bavarian University recently uncovered a Russian scientist sharing sensitive information about the European Space Agency’s Ariane program with Moscow.
The EU is now in the process of introducing a dedicated knowledge exchange platform, aimed at bolstering security against academic espionage. This move comes as a response to the existing lack of coordination between countries, where divergent approaches have been implemented across different nations. In Switzerland, collaboration between universities and the national intelligence services has expanded, with Chinese scientists and doctoral students hired with considerable caution, if at all. In Germany, Universities are taking it into their own hands to suspend collaborations with the Chinese Scholarship Council.
Let us reconsider the trade-off mentioned earlier. Imposing restrictions on researchers, and limiting their collaborations, risks compromising academic freedom. Is blocking entry for students outside the EU the most optimal solution for European academia’s challenges? This approach may hinder academic excellence and raises ethical concerns. How far can we curtail opportunities for many based on the actions of a few? The establishment of a holistic approach to knowledge and research security may strike a better balance in combating academic espionage and insider risks in universities. This approach not only protects knowledge centres but also enhances their potential. By considering various indicators and implementing countermeasures beyond country-based restrictions, we can offer substantial solutions to this problem. Awareness programs, psychological and behavioural indicators, and a strong security culture from within can contribute significantly to achieving this balance.